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Abstract. There are two contrary types of approaches to multiagent design and
modelling, each having its specific shortcomings: first, top-down (normative) ap-
proaches that emphasise social level control; and second, bottom-up (construc-
tivist) approaches that emphasise agent autonomy. This paper introduces a “mid-
dle way” between these two types. A novel social reasoning architecture called
INFFRA is described that integrates normative and constructivist properties. This
architecture is based on the sociological concepts of frame and framing and fo-
cuses on the cognitive processing of social and organisational knowledge. It is
presented at a conceptual level, and first suggestions are made as to its concrete
implementation, as well as comments on open problems that we find challenging
for our future research.
1 Introduction
The fundamental dilemma between autonomy, which is undoubtedly a key aspect of
multiagent systems (MAS) research that has largely contributed to the success and ap-
peal of the field, and social-level control, that aims at ensuring society-level coher-
ence, has long been identified in the MAS community. In recent years, two contrary
lines of research have evolved that reflect this dilemma. The one line encompasses top-
down approaches to multiagent system design and modelling. The key characteristic
of these approaches is that they offer a “structuralist” view of multiagent societies by
enforcing pre-designed social structures on individual agents in a strictly normative
fashion. Prominent examples of such social structures are pre-designed interaction pro-
tocols (e.g., [1, 8, 23]), social laws (e.g., [20]), protocols applied to a priori determine
interaction paths (e.g., [1, 8, 23]), and roles employed to a priori specify required ca-
pabilities (e.g., [10]), rights and duties (e.g., [23]), and/or tasks [7] to be fulfilled by
the agents. Top-down approaches are motivated by the fairly wide consensus among
multiagent researchers that a normative use of social structures is a useful means to
harness the dangers of incoherent, chaotic system behaviour, and so it is not surprising
that much effort has been invested in developing top-down design methods, frame-
works and tools ([2] provides an overview). Yet, many researchers reject this norma-
tive “top-down imposition”, arguing that approaches following this line are nothing but
behaviour-constraining models of sociality. In other words, the key critique of these
approaches is that they put too much emphasis on an agent-independent organisational
level and, with that, inherently tend to seriously restrict agents in their autonomy. The
other line of research is that of bottom-up approaches to multiagent system design and
modelling. These are characterised by the “constructivist” view of artificial societies
that they offer and that emphasises the autonomy and the motives of individualistic
rational agents. According to this view, the focus of agent research should be on the
development of rational reasoning mechanisms that enable individual agents to de-
rive information about others and to construct models of others’ goals and intentions.
Two examples of such approaches are [13, 18], and a good overview of many related
decision- and game-theoretic approaches is presented in [19]. A key problem with these
approaches, however, is that they fail to explain in sufficient detail how socially intel-
ligent behaviour can emerge, under various conditions, as a necessary result from the
individual agents’ “reasoning about others” and “models of others”. In other words,
while attempting to avoid any restrictions on the agents’ choices, these approaches run
the risk to not achieve global coherence. The reason for this simply is that individually
derived “models of others” lag far behind the richness of “normative” social and organ-
isational knowledge as used by top-down approaches and thus are not really helpful in
reducing the agents’ uncertainty about the “social world” in which they are embedded.
An obviously urgent question thus is how the top-down (normative) line and bottom-
up (constructivist) line of multiagent design and modelling can be combined while at
the same time avoiding their respective major drawbacks. In other words, the question
is how to use knowledge about different kinds of social structures within a multiagent
system so as to obtain social order without unnecessarily restricting agent autonomy.
Undoubtedly, this question constitutes a long-term scientific challenge, since its an-
swering requires to bring together thoughts and ideas that have evolved independently
over many years. For that reason it should be clear that a complete answer can not be
expected at this stage of research in the field. Instead, what is needed in a first step is
a profound conceptual basis for more specific theoretical and experimental work. The
work described in this paper is intended to provide such a conceptual basis. A novel
social reasoning architecture called INFFRA (INteraction Frames and FRAming) is in-
troduced that offers a “middle way” between both “top down” and “bottom up”: like
conventional top-down approaches, this architecture respects the importance of social
and organisational knowledge in the process of achieving social order; and like conven-
tional bottom-up approaches, this architecture respects the importance of the individual
agents’ behavioural freedom. INFFRA significantly differs from available top-down and
bottom-up approaches in that it re-interprets the notion of “social structures” and “or-
ganisations” in two fundamental ways:
1. with respect to their locus – by viewing them as mental models of the social context
that agents have rather than as rules that uniformly apply throughout an entire MAS,
and
2. with respect to their purpose – by assuming them to be descriptive models of agent
experience rather than prescriptive models of behaviour.
This means that according to InFFra the whole process of structuring and organising
interaction processes into roles, protocols, relationships etc. takes place in the agent’s
mind through active reasoning (and is not simply “adopted” by the agent), where the
evolving structural and organisational patterns can only be used by agents as models of
past regularities of behaviour rather than as “models of committed and ascertained fu-
ture behaviour”. The key idea underlying INFFRA thus is that social and organisational
knowledge evolves within autonomous individuals through interaction, and structures
future experience to the end of reducing contingencies for the individual. More specifi-
cally, according to INFFRA this integration of social-level order and individual-level au-
tonomy is achieved through the use of special mental representations of organisational
knowledge (“frames”) and their application and adaptation (“framing”) by autonomous,
self-interested agents. The concepts of frames and framing are borrowed from the work
of the sociologist Erving Goffman [11], and so INFFRA also offers the advantage of
being well founded in a contemporary sociological theory.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces Goffman’s
concepts of “frame” and “framing”. In Section 3 we develop a computational model
of frames, which are used as the central data structure in the social reasoning architec-
ture based on framing that is described in Section 4. Section 5 rounds up with some
conclusions and an outlook on directions for further research on the topic.
2 First principles: sociological background, computational model
2.1 Sociological concepts
Frames [11] are one of the key concepts in the sociological analyses of everyday life
that Erving Goffman engaged in throughout his research. In short, a frame can be seen
as the answer to the simple question “what is going on here?” that each human poses
to herself in any interaction situation, consciously or unconsciously. That is, it provides
“framing” information about a particular class of interaction situations that will allow
the participant to act “appropriately”, i.e. in a competent, routine fashion.
In a MAS context, we can view them as “data structures” that contain sufficient
organisational knowledge to structure interaction for the individual that employs them.
In that, they re-construct what is in-between agents rather than what is inside agents,
as most mentalistic approaches do. While offering this advantage of being “genuinely
social”, they are still linked to the mental processes of the agent which is using them,
and hence allow for a construction of purely deliberative agent architectures.
Of course, attempting to use such frames as interaction models in order to manage
interactions effectively raises the question of how they will be employed by agents in
practice, provided that an adequate, sufficiently complex and rich “database” of such
frames is available to the interactant which has been acquired through experience. In
accordance with the imagery of knowledge frames putting the situation “in the pic-
ture”, Goffman calls this process “framing” to suggest that the issue we should focus
on in analysing social interaction is which actors use what frames how and under which
conditions.
Inspired by this (crudely simplified interpretation of a particular) micro-social the-
ory, we can attempt to make use of it in computational terms. In order to translate the
concepts of “frames” and “framing” into tractable computational models, we must first
explain what kinds of information would be needed inside such frames in order to cap-
ture the properties of a class of interactions that make it distinct for the framing agent
and thus may reduce the “search space” concerning the agent’s expectations and the
expectations that others have of it.
2.2 Required properties of a computational model
If a frame is to “feed” the interaction with sufficient information, it must exhibit the
following properties:
1. Common knowledge: It must be allegedly shared knowledge among the interacting
agents. When one agent uses it, it must assume its peer(s) to have the same infor-
mation. Only if this is assumed a priori can the “mentalistic” models of belief (with
the related epistemic problems of attaining equal belief states [12]) be abandoned
in favour of models of social expectations.
2. Relevance: The interactional knowledge captured by the frame must be grounded
in agents’ experience, it must occur repeatedly, and it must describe the relevant
aspects of the interaction in question adequately.
3. Generalisation: It must generalise from particular enactments of a class of inter-
actions. By being expressive enough to abstract from individual actors, situational
contexts and actual actions performed during an interaction it provides an expres-
sive means of capturing the characteristics of a whole class of interactions in a
single data model.
4. Instrumentalisation: The knowledge captured by it must relate to the agent’s pri-
vate goals and preferences. If the agent is to gain from using frame knowledge,
that knowledge has to be processed in a goal-directed manner in order to fulfil its
purpose.
As concerns requirements 1 and 4, they can be realised by separating frame knowledge
into common attributes and private attributes, the former employed in reasoning “as if”
interaction partners had the same knowledge, the latter expressing the agent’s current
stance towards the frame in question (that is not visible to others).
The conditions stated in 2 and 3 refer to “qualitative” aspects of the knowledge a
frame captures. They require that agents identify what matters to them through their
experience of past encounters, and that they be able to store those pieces of informa-
tion efficiently in expressive representations. This will in part have to be ensured by
application-specific heuristics and learning algorithms, but we have also developed a
generic computational model of frames to support this process, which is discussed at
length in the following section.
3 Interaction frames
Interaction frames, as we use them, must be thought of as data structures that consist
of two parts, the common attributes section and the private attributes section, which
follow the intuition just laid out. The common attributes section incorporates all knowl-
edge that is necessary to carry out and interpret a particular class of interactions, while
private attributes are used to store the status ascribed to common attributes in the current
situation by the agent who is employing the frame.
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Fig. 1. A trajectory model: three actors   ,   ,   (actually roles, cf. below) perceive each
other’s actions and react upon them. Agents’ activities (shaded boxes) evoke reactions in their
peers along the vertical time-line. Arrows denote explicit messages, while actions themselves
might include “physical” actions that are publicly observable.
3.1 Common attributes
Trajectories Common attributes are formed around trajectories [21] as models of
“guided doings” [11], i.e. temporally ordered action sequences of actors that relate to
each other. These must have “communication-like” properties, which means that they
are (1) explicitly performed by individuals, (2) perceived by the counter-parties in-
volved and (3) reacted upon. They have the semantics of “gestures” [15], since they
evoke certain reactions and generate an “image” of the actors performing them.
The most genuine kind of such trajectories is, of course, communicative action,
i.e. messages in the context of communication protocols, but, in principle, any action
can count as part of a trajectory as soon as it spawns some reaction in another agent.
These trajectories constitute the core of an interaction frame by expressing what the
frame is about: a particular kind of interaction processes. In order to generalise from
overtly specific descriptions that reduce the trajectory model to a single situation that
will never be repeated, we use generalised trajectory models (with variables for actors
and individual attributes of trajectories [17]) that merely describe properties of a whole
class of interaction instances thus covering a (suitably) wide range of situations.
We do not intend to restrict ourselves to a single formalism for expressing such tra-
jectories at this point, since the adequacy of particular formalisms may vary between
applications, and we therefore only use abstract graphical models of protocol-like tra-
jectories as the one depicted in Figure 1.
To the least, employed formalisms should enable a description of agents’ actions,
time and branching to account for points of choice. Good candidates include multi-
modal branching-time logics with deontic operators, probabilistic sequential diagrams,
etc.
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Fig. 2. Role and relationship model.
Roles & Relationships Like trajectories generalise from individual courses of action,
roles abstract from individuals. We suggest that a powerful concept of role models as
data structures must encompass three kinds of attributes that define a role   :
1. Behavioural attributes
(a) Expected behaviour: Information about what   usually does or does not.
(b) Skills: Information concerning the capabilities of   (possible actions).
2. Intentional attributes
(a) Goals, Tasks, Intentions: The teleological grounding of   ’s actions.
(b) Values/Preferences: The valuations   has of certain events or states of affairs.
(c) Beliefs: Knowledge states of   .
3. Social attributes (Relationships)
(a) Dependencies: Actions of other roles that are needed for   to do something.
(b) Aggregation/Representation: What roles   consists of or pertains to (in case of
groups, formal organisations etc.), and information about who is seen to act on
behalf of such aggregates.
(c) Acquaintance: Information regarding the knowledge   has of other roles and
agents.
Since the literature on modelling roles abounds [8, 10, 14, 23], we will not describe the
formalisms we use in our model here (a detailed account can be found in [17]). Instead,
we will only introduce an informal, simple graphical notation for capturing role and
relationship knowledge, cf. Figure 2: It shows agent roles as rounded nodes and group
roles as hexagons with a boundary box around members, possibly overlapping; these are
interlinked through relationship arcs (for various types of relationships). The vertical
line may be used as a “status” scale, if a one-dimensional measure has been defined
(e.g. by computing the total of existing dependencies for each role).
Contexts Having abstracted from actions and actors, there is also a need to abstract
from situations in which the frame becomes relevant, and this is achieved by using
context models. These consist of two parts:
1. Relevance Conditions
(a) Activation conditions: conditions, under which the frame will be adopted by
the participating parties (e.g. receiving a request for information).
(b) Deactivation conditions: statements about events and states of affairs that make
agents abandon the frame (e.g. a peer terminating a discussion).
2. Enactment Conditions
(a) Preconditions: conditions that are necessary for the frame to be carried out
correctly (e.g. existence of disagreement in a negotiation frame).
(b) Postconditions: conditions that are always ensured after a frame has been com-
pleted (e.g. a new task allocation).
(c) Sustainment conditions: conditions that must hold throughout the enactment of
a frame (e.g. availability of communication channels).
As Figure 3 suggests, the “scope” of a trajectory is defined by embedding it into a con-
text model: most importantly, context models define clear-cut conditions for adoption
and abandonment of the frame. Choosing appropriate conditions for these contexts has
a huge impact on the usefulness of the frame, since it guides the search in a frame
“repository” that the agent has at its disposition. Once activation conditions are met, the
agent will use the frame and the trajectory knowledge will become normative for her by
influencing action choices, until deactivation conditions become true, whereupon the
agent abandons the frame and attempts “re-framing” (this is explained in more detail in
Section 4).
Enactment conditions are a somewhat weaker concept than relevance conditions,
but equally useful. While they don’t trigger activation and deactivation, they supply
information about what is needed to carry out the frame properly and about what the
frame achieves. Especially postconditions can be of vital importance to the agent, since
they make explicit what the consequences of frame enactment are, and thus guide the
agent’s search for a “useful” frame – a “social operator” in the terminology of AI plan-
ning, if one wants (cf. “Instrumentalisation” in Section 2.2).
Beliefs In comparison to roles, norms and contexts, the beliefs model part of the com-
mon attributes section in a frame plays a subordinate role with respect to our theoretical
intuitions. Although it may contain beliefs that are necessary to execute and interpret
the frame properly, e.g. causal or conceptual knowledge (as Figure 4 suggests), it can be
neglected (or even not be filled with data at all) as long as the interaction itself occurs
as expected. Frames still reserve a slot for such frame-related epistemic knowledge,
mainly to cater for situations in which the designer may wish to “locate” certain knowl-
edge (e.g. meta-level knowledge such as ontologies) within the boundaries of a certain
frame.
Links and history. Links, that relate an entire frame to other frames by such rela-
tionships as aggregation, inheritance in the object-oriented sense and also by semantic
relations (such as “   is an alternative to  ”, “   is a variant of  by sharing the same
set of roles” etc.), and histories, that relate a frame to previous or subsequent frames
by recording the modifications performed when deriving new frames (“   was derived
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Fig. 3. Context model with embedded trajectory that shows conditions   in shaded (relevance)
and white (enactment) boxes/arrows.
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Fig. 4. Two-part belief model with conceptual and causal beliefs. Roles’ beliefs are depicted as
shaded sub-areas of the networks.
from  by adding precondition  to its context model”) are both captured by building
up frame repositories. These are databases that comprise various frames (in the form
shown in Figure 5) linked to each other which are used by the agent (as information that
is local to its mental processes) to manage the framing process described in Section 4.
The whole of an agent’s frame repository thus constitutes that agent’s “social world”
[21], i.e. we assume in the following that it is the locus of all social reasoning the
agent conducts, and that this social reasoning can be clearly distinguished from the
agent’s sub-social reasoning capabilities such as intentional processes like planning,
scheduling, deliberating and physical processes like perception and physical action.
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3.2 Private attributes
As mentioned in Section 2.2, frames must not be thought of as passive data structures
that contain information about certain types of interaction processes. They rather con-
stitute models that both are constructed by and support the decision-making processes
of agents. Therefore, the common attributes that represent shared interactional knowl-
edge must be supplemented with local information about the individual experiences and
evaluations of the agent using them if they are to aid in the process of organising social
experience. This is achieved by the private attributes section of the frame data struc-
ture, which basically contains “status” slots for each of the common attributes. More
specifically, these are:
1. role assignment status,
2. trajectory status,
3. activation status and
4. belief status.
All of them contain mappings for all facts in the respective common attribute and as-
sessments concerning the private evaluations of the current state of affairs. To keep
things simple, we will not extend the notation of Figure 5, since status data can be
simply added to the four slots already introduced.
As for the concrete processes, by which the resulting values of private attributes
are determined, they are the result of the framing process and depend on the particular
architecture employed to achieve framing. One such architecture is introduced in the
next section.
4 INFFRA – A social reasoning architecture based on framing
Designing a social reasoning architecture based on the notion of framing means both
describing how frames are constructed by an agent and how they are used in prac-
tice. Framing is a very complex activity that involves (1) tracking the enactment of
activated frames, (2) choosing whether to retain the current frame or to change frame
when appropriate, (3) modifying frame knowledge with experience and (4) relating
these three activities to one’s private goals in order to make them part of individually
rational decision-making.
4.1 Overview
The top-level view of a framing process can be described in a simple way by the fol-
lowing steps that an agent has to perform in each reasoning cycle:
1. Situation interpretation: Interpret recent percepts in terms of a perceived frame.
2. Frame matching: Compare the perceived frame with the activated frame. Deter-
mine a difference model describing the results of this comparison.
3. Framing assessment: Assess the usability of the active frame.
4. Framing decision: If the current frame seems appropriate, continue with 6. Else,
proceed with 5.
5. Re-framing: Determine a new frame.
(a) Search: Search the frame repository for more suitable frames. If candidates are
found, proceed with 5(b). Else, proceed with 5(c).
(b) “Mock-activation”: Activate one of the candidates above as trial frame, go
back to 1.
(c) Adjustment: Iteratively modify frames in the frame repository and continue
with 5(a).
6. Frame enactment: Derive commitments that result from the activated frame.
7. Behaviour generation: Influence action decisions by applying these commitments.
Return to 1.
The intuition behind this process is a very simple one: as long as the activated frame (the
frame currently “in use”) seems appropriate given the current interaction situation (the
perceived frame), it is maintained and influences the behaviour generating processes
that the agent employs at the sub-social level (by generating commitments that stem
from the frame data). If it fails to match the needs of the situation or those of the agent,
the frame repository is searched for alternatives, and if none exist, frames are adapted
until promising alternatives are found. These are iteratively instantiated as trial frames
and tested against current conditions (“as if” they had been activated). If a suitable
alternative has been found, it is finally activated (if not, the re-framing process never
terminates).
If successful, this process ensures that the following conditions hold throughout all
interactions:
1. Some frame is always active – the agent always has its model of the social context.
FF F F
deviate 
F
perceived frame
F
activated frame difference model
compliance
action
comply
deviance
F2
determine frame
desirability goals/values
module
perception
update
sub−social level
model
descriptive 
situation interpretation
module
frame matching
module
behaviour generation frame enactment
F1
model
F3 Fn
prescriptive
model
framing determine frame
adequacy
determine frame
validity
generate
switch
frame adjustment
private
perception
create
current
compliance/
module
repository
normative
model
frame
framing decision
reasons
modify
derive commitments alternative
frames
trial instantiate
modulemodule
assessment
updates
frame
. . . . .
deviance
data 
Framing Architecture
contexts
roles
beliefs
trajectories
Fig. 6. Detailed view of the framing-based agent architecture. The main line of reasoning between
perception and action (shown as a shaded arrow) captures both the sub-processes involved and
the temporal order in which they occur.
2. The activated frame is always deemed appropriate both considering the agent’s own
motives and goals and with respect to the observed course of interaction.
3. The frame repository is only significantly modified when needed1.
The top-level view of the INFFRA architecture given above has already introduced its
central data structures (active frame, perceived frame, trial frame, difference model,
frame repository). In the remainder of this section, we will focus on the processing that
is performed on them inside INFFRA.
4.2 The architecture in detail
A detailed view of the entire architecture is given in Figure 6. It includes both the data
structures just introduced and several functional components that embody the function-
ality required to conduct the reasoning steps described on page 10. The entire reasoning
component must be thought of as a social-level reasoner that is added to the mental
models and processes that already exist in the agent to manage sub-social activities,
e.g. a conventional BDI architecture. The way in which it interacts with these “local
reasoning” functions in the framing assessment, re-framing and frame enactment steps
will be described in the following paragraphs, which also include details for all the
functional modules that appear in Figure 6.
Situation interpretation module This module obtains the current perceived frame and
incoming percepts as inputs, and outputs a frame that is used as a descriptive model of
the current situation for matching purposes.
1 Not counting the tracking of private status attributes that are always added to frame data.
In order to be compared against the active frame, current percepts should always
be interpreted in terms of a perceived frame, i.e. they should be clustered and classified
into roles, trajectories, contexts and beliefs, so that the currently ongoing interaction is
captured adequately. A simple implementation might consist of a perception-tracking
function that simply records ongoing interaction with respect to a time window of given
length. The observed percepts might be categorised into “context” and “interaction”,
e.g. by classifying certain agents (and the physical environment) as belonging to one of
these two categories. For the sake of simplicity, void role and relationship models can
be used in first prototypes, since perceived behaviour need not be separated by a role-
behaviour/trajectory-behaviour dichotomy for the sake of matching. Likewise, beliefs
need not make part of perceived frames in simple implementations – it suffices if they
are included in the frames pertaining to the frame repository.
Frame matching module This module is the locus of matching the perceived frame
(as a descriptive model of interaction “as is”) with the active frame (a normative picture
of what the interaction “should be like”), whereupon it produces the difference model,
which contains lists of observations that conform with the active frame and of percepts
that deviate from the expected course of action (in the process of re-framing, it compares
“trial frames” with the perceived frame). Finally, it outputs frame knowledge of the
active frame as prescriptive information to the “frame enactment module” which is
responsible for biasing decision-making according to the data contained in that frame.
Framing assessment module The assessment module constitutes, together with the
adjustment module, the core of the framing architecture. It evaluates the data obtained
from the difference model with respect to three measures:
Frame adequacy. This measure computes the degree to which the context model is sat-
isfied by the current situation, which is important in order to determine whether the
frame can and should be used in the current context, with two respects: first, failure
to meet context preconditions and sustainment conditions jeopardises correct execution
of the actions prescribed by the frame; second, the occurrence of deactivation condi-
tions implies initiating a re-framing procedure, and occurrence of activation conditions
spawns the adoption of particular frames. Thus, assessing context adequacy is the “first
filter pass” that has to be performed prior to any further evaluation of the active frame.
Frame validity. This measure that is computed after the frame has been found to be
adequate in the current context expresses to which degree the observed interaction pro-
cess matches the trajectory data. Mainly, it is used to infer whether the interacting par-
ties meet the expectations induced by the frame, i.e. whether they are “doing the right
thing”. The result of assessing frame validity should be a detailed description of who
fails to comply with which expectation for what reason. Obviously, if this description
proves the active frame to be a “false” interpretation of what is going on, re-framing
must be attempted.
Frame desirability. Given that the active frame is both adequate and valid, it remains to
be evaluated regarding the agent’s private goals. As mentioned before, social reasoning
is supposed to serve individual rationality, so a frame that fails to reflect this rationality
must be abandoned. Implementing this functionality implies comparing
1. the post-conditions ensured by enacting the frame,
2. the restrictions the role models of the frame induce on agent behaviour and
3. the actions and events occurring inside the frame trajectory model
to the agent’s goals and preferences with in order to maintain a frame only if it seems
desirable.
Obviously there are various possibilities for combining these three measures in or-
der to make an appropriate framing decision. In any case, the assessment module should
output both the framing decision to the enactment/adjustment module (in the case of
comply/deviate, respectively) and the reasons for the re-framing decision to the adjust-
ment model, in case a better frame must be sought for (this information about deviance,
unsatisfied private goals, etc. can then be used to better guide the search for a new
frame).
Frame adjustment module Frame adjustment (which controls re-framing by embody-
ing search, adjustment and mock-activation control) always occurs when the agent has
decided to cancel activation of the current frame. Using the reasons for this decision,
the frame repository data and operators that allow for switching to, modifying and cre-
ating new frames (which are used in this order: first, an existing alternative is sought
for, then existing frames are adequately adapted, and only if both procedures fail to pro-
duce satisfactory results, an entirely new frame is created) trial frames are generated,
which are used as “mock instances” for the active frame data structure. Just like the
active frame, any trial frame can be matched against the perceived frame, and if the
difference model resulting from this trial instantiation is reasonably “small”, the trial
frame becomes the active frame. In terms of machine learning terminology, it can be
regarded as the current learning hypothesis chosen from the hypothesis space the frame
repository constitutes, with frame modification operators defining the process of search
in this hypothesis space.
The variety of algorithms that could be used in this module for frame modification
(i.e. the interesting case) is vast: however, it should be possible to represent most of
these as special cases of a generic search process using attribute modification operators
(that alter common attributes of a given repository frame) as search operators for node
expansion with prioritisation according to (1) statements in the agent’s private goal base
and (2) statements that express recently perceived observations.
As concerns switching, a “matching measure” (as used in case-based reasoning al-
gorithms [16]) is one possibility to guide search, and, obviously, generating a com-
pletely new frame is the “last option” that can always be applied if the other two mech-
anisms fail, yet at the risk of not being shared by any peer, since a new frame is not
supported by prior experience2.
Frame enactment module When a framing choice has been made (regardless whether
this is the product of frame compliance or that of re-framing), the frame enactment
2 A point that has to be paid much attention to is, here, the question of how to avoid “infinite
trials”, by re-searching for new alternatives over and over. It is quite possible that meta-framing
reasoning components are needed here, but at present, we have not developed a theory that
extends our approach with this respect in a natural way.
module is used to generate commitments for the agent that result from the employed
frame. In practice, this means that directives are output to the “behaviour generation
module” at the right point in time (according to the temporal model of the trajectory)
which inform the agent about social obligations, permissions and prohibitions that it
should respect.
Additionally, the frame enactment module fills the private attributes’ slots in the
active frame by recording the information obtained from the assessment module (the
assessment module contains all information about matching results and also all private
evaluations that are necessary to derive private attribute values).
So apart from implementing the expectations that result from the framing decision,
this module also takes over the functionalities needed to record framing experience.
Behaviour generation module This final functional component obtains current social
“constraints” on action computed by the frame enactment module and influences the ac-
tion choices of the agent. Figure 6 and the above description of the architecture seem to
suggest that action choices made by the agent at a sub-social level are simply overruled
by these social-level decisions, and, indeed, this is the intuition we have in general.
However, alternatives to this “strict” overriding of local reasoning can be conceived of,
and so we include this module to cater for richer models of combining individual with
social choices.
5 Conclusions
The dilemma between applying a top-down approach in MAS design by using rich mod-
els of sociality and between the appeal of enabling true autonomy that is put forward
by proponents of bottom-up approaches has lead us to attempt a “middle way” between
both views.
On the one hand, we concede that using organisational knowledge that is located
above the level of simple interaction protocols and individualistic reasoning mecha-
nisms and that captures social role, action, context and belief models is both useful and
necessary if agents are expected to cope with the contingencies of interaction in artifi-
cial societies. Yet, on the other hand, our approach re-interprets organisational models
as models of experience rather than of top-down design, thus attempting to focus more
on the possibilities of designing how such models are processed by the agent rather
than how they can be successfully designed by human designers. From this follows that
we concentrate on how individual autonomy and social normativity can be successfully
combined to yield true social intelligence.
We have identified frames and framing as useful sociological concepts in the devel-
opment of a social reasoning architecture: in contrast to top-down sociological theories,
these concepts assume a symbolic interactionist perspective (Gasser [9, 10] was the first
to introduce concepts from this school of research in DAI, cf. his comments in [2]) that
allows for a very natural combination of the cognitive and the social level of intelli-
gence – we have underpinned this hypothesis by showing that both notions can be used
as starting points for developing realistic computational models.
We contribute to the literature on social reasoning architectures by introducing the
framing architecture INFFRA that contains a number of interesting features:
1. a notion of focus and contextuality in agent interaction (that reduces decision-
making complexity by using micro-trajectorial models),
2. a multi-dimensional abstraction from interaction experience by generalising from
actors (roles), actions (trajectories), and situations (contexts) and
3. a treatment of social and organisational models as models of experience, insepara-
bly linked to agents’ private goals and preferences.
To our knowledge, there exists no social reasoning architecture or methodology that
makes use of a combination of these aspects. Also, frames and framing provide con-
cepts that can be used at least at three different levels: for software engineering pur-
poses, where designers conduct “soft social design” by designing appropriate frame
repositories, for meta-frame negotiation, where frames are the target of a negotiation
process between agents that aim to find consensus on “how they are going to interact”,
and, finally, (in the totally open view we have suggested in this paper) for social learn-
ing as the process of evolving “interaction cases” and shared social and organisational
knowledge.
Finally, we have presented a new perspective on social learning as an adaptation
process that focuses around models of “interaction cases” that are assumed to be shared
knowledge, which nicely contrasts efforts that aim at “learning about others” in terms
of finding out what the other thinks. Although it still remains to be proven that concrete
algorithms will successfully tackle the problem of “learning frames” as genuinely social
models of action, we believe that transcending the mentalist position is certainly what
is needed in future multiagent learning research. INFFRA can be seen as a first step in
this direction.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is a long-term scientific challenge to achieve
useful and conceptually clear combinations of elements of bottom-up and top-down
MAS design. Since our endeavour to develop such theories and systems has just started,
it is not surprising that a lot of work lies ahead. Currently, we are working on proof-of-
concept implementations that are expected to illustrate the adequacy of our approach.
The main challenge that we are currently faced with is to successfully combine the so-
cial reasoning architecture we have laid out here with sub-social goal-directed reason-
ing. In particular, Goffmanian theories do not give prescriptive advice of how to employ
frames in order to “succeed in social life”, and, hence, we have to come up with our own
theory of integrating the framing architecture with e.g. BDI agents, game-theoretic util-
ity models, etc. Given the novel perspective on social rationality that INFFRA offers, it
has a large potential as a suitable architecture to study this and other issues.
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